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NOTES AND COMMENT
the wife the right to bring a tort action against the husband himself ?
Palpably the intent of the legislature is not clear and therefore the
common law should prevail.
It is an accepted tenet, that under the common law the husband
had no right of action against his spouse for being one with her, he
could not sue himself. The construction of the statute by the majority
in this case creates new rights for the wife and hence necessarily
creates new rights for the husband since the constitution guarantees
equal rights for all. Now if such radical change in the law had been
the intent of the legislature, it must surely have expressed itself with
indisputable dearness and definiteness. This it did not do.
Undoubtedly the legislature intended to remove discriminations
against married women and give them equal rights with their husbands
before the law and consequently the statute should not be construed as
creating new rights, which it does under the interpretation of the ma-
jority opinion since at common law neither spouse had the right to
sue the other. Neither was it the intent of the legislature to open the
door to increased litigation which might presumably follow for as
Justice Eschweiler states: "The uninvited kiss no matter how cold
and chaste, upon the non-consenting alabaster feme sole brow, is an
assault and battery and substantial damages may be awarded for
such."1 4
Regarding the public policy affected by this decision, it has always
been recognized that while marriage is a civil contract, so far as its
validity in law is concerned, yet the moment such contract is entered
into, a status of an exclusive nature arises between the parties, and
many of the rules applicable to contrasts are necessarily excluded from
application to the marriage contract. The peace and tranquility of
the conjugal relation demand that each party to a marriage forswear,
certain rights which each enjoys as a sole and hence the common law
has always refused to recognize tort liabilities between the members
of a family.
URBAN R. WITTIG
Automobiles: Guest and invitee; negligence, degree of care.-
With the great volume of automobile cases which has of recent years
kept our courts busy to capacity one might think that the law as it ap-
plies to owners and operators of motor vehicles should be quite definitely
settled. To a considerable extent this is true and because of this fact
comparatively few such cases are being appealed. Occasionally, how-
ever, a decision is rendered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court which
materially changes the practising attorney's preconceived notions as to
this branch of the law.
The liability of the owner or operator of an automobile to an invited
guest in the various situations that may arise has been, and still is, some-
what in doubt. A decision of considerable importance on this phase of
the law was decided by the Supreme Court on October 12, 1926.1
"36 Wis. 657, i7 Am. Rep. 504.
Cleary v. Eckart, 211 N.W. (Wis.).
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In this case plaintiff was a guest, riding with the defendant in her
automobile. Defendant was proceeding at a reasonable rate of speed
on a gravel road on which there was considerable loose gravel over a
hardpan surface. Shortly after entering the gravel the defendant felt a
bump in the rear of the car. She immediately applied her brakes to
stop the car. The car skidded around and plaintiff was thrown out and
received personal injuries. The only negligence that could be attributed
to the defendant was her failure to skilfully handle the car in an
emergency.
In an earlier case, Mitchell v. Raymond,2 the Supreme Court had
laid down the general rule as follows:
Under this rule as now determined, the host who assumes to pilot his
vehicle upon the public highways, subject as all such vehicles are to the rules
and regulations governing traffic on our crowded present-day thoroughfares,
becomes chargeable in such operation and management of his vehicle with the
duty of exercising ordinary care to avoid injury to his occupant. This conclusion
we are forced to reach even though the rule as thus declared may seem incon-
gruous with the innate and natural spirit of gratitude with which such hospitality
should be met. [Italics ours.]
In the Cleary case it was pointed out that the Supreme Court in the
case of Greenfield v. Miller,3 had held that a host was not liable in the
absence of active negligence, to a guest in a private residence. A similar
ruling was made in O'Shea v. Lavoy,4 where the injury was due to a
defect in an automobile which was not known to the owner.
Realizing the injustice of the broad rule of Mitchell v. Raymond,
supra the Supreme Court in the case now under consideration has seen
fit to limit that rule by saying:
But the situation here presented indicates that such field was too loosely and
too broadly defined (in the Mitchell case): The rule therein expressed and above
quoted is now modified to read as follows:
"As to gratuitous guests in a vehicle on a public highway the owner or driver
of such vehicle owes to such guest the duty of exercising ordinary care, not to
increase the danger to the guest, or to create a new danger." [Italics ours.]
It seems to the writer that the decision in the Cleary case will be of
very great importance, particularly because of the fact that the Supreme
Court has recently held that a wife may sue a husband for negligence
in the operation of an automobile in which the wife is a guest. It is a
matter of common knowledge that most automobile accident cases are
defended by lawyers employed by insurance companies. Since the
husband and wife rule has been established many cases have been
brought in which the insurance companies have felt that the suits were
not bona fida in the sense that the injured spouses would not have
brought suit excepting for the purpose of procuring the proceeds of the
policy which in fact had been written for the protection of the automo-
bile owner rather than for the benefit of the person who might be in-
jured.
Such cases are very difficult to defend for the reason that the natural
interest of the assured is with the person suing and it has been
:2181 Wis. 591, 195 NX.W. 855.
173 Wis. 184, i8o N.W. 834.
' 175 Wis. 456, 185 N.W. 525, 2o A.L.R. ioo8.
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felt that the insurance companies could not get the cooperation from
the policy holders to which they are entitled. The limitation of
liability as made in the Cleary case will be a considerable deterrent to
hubands or wives suing the other under circumstances where no culpable
negligence exists. CHrAS. B. QumARLF-s*
Homestead: Alienation; Abandonment; Estoppel;-Article I,
Section 17 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "the privilege
of the debtor to enjoy the necessary~comforts of life shall be recognized
by wholesome laws exempting a reasonable amount of property from
seizure or sale for the payment of any debt hereafter contracted."
In pursuance of this section the statutes state "A homestead shall be
exempt from execution . . . . for the debts of such owner to the amount
in value of $5000"' . . . ., and the section providing for methods of.
conveyancing says, "but no mortgage or other alienation by a married
man of his homestead exempt from execution or any interest therein,
legal or equitable, present or future, by deed or otherwise without his
wife's consent, evidenced by her act of joining in the deed, mortgage
or other conveyance shall be valid or of any effect whatever. ... "2
The plaintiff and defendants in Krueger "v. Groth et ux3 each owned a
homestead consisting of farm lands and buildings. By an oral agree-
ment between Krueger, the plaintiff, and Groth, who, with his wife, is
a defendant, an exchange of the farms was decided upon and carried
out as to the occupation of the respective preniises.
After several months occupation of Krueger's former farm and
homestead, the defendants, the Groths, refused to consumate the oral
agreement by an exchange of deeds, contending that the oral agreement
was void for lack of the wife's joining in the conveyance of the home-
stead.
In an action for specific performance the trial court sustained the
defendants but on appeal the case went to the plaintiffs.
In this case the court bases its decision on the ground of abandon-
ment and equitable estoppel. "The homstead exemption being a
privilege and not a title to land, it had lost, by defendants voluntary
acts, all existence or efficacy." -"Manifestly the defendants cannot have
the benefits of two homesteads at one and the same time."
Under a statute similar to our own it was said, "Where a husband
and wife orally agree to sell their homestead and the vendee pays the
purchase price, enters into possession and makes improvements with
the knowledge and consent of the wife she cannot successfully defend
in a suit for specific performance."4 In applying the doctrine of estoppel
the court does not confine itself to facts, representations, or conceal-
ments as of the time of-the transaction but also to subsequent conduct
relied upon by the opposite party to his damage.
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
"Wis. Stat. 272.20.
'Wis. Stat. 235.0.
$ 190 Wis.-,2o9 N.W. 773.
4 IO Idaho 459-O9 Am. St. Rep. 214.
